On May 28, 2014, the Illinois House of Representatives unanimously passed House Bill 8, which amends the Illinois Human Rights Act to require Illinois employers to provide reasonable accommodations to employees for conditions related to pregnancy and child-birth. The reasonable accommodations would include, for example, modification to job duties or work schedules, assistance with physical work, seating, frequent water and restroom breaks, time-off to recover from child-birth, and private non-bathroom space for breast-feeding or pumping. House Bill 8, which was already passed by the Illinois Senate, will become effective January 1, 2015, if it is signed into law by Governor Quinn.
Employment Law Chicago Blog
On May 20, 2014, the Illinois State Senate approved legislation that would expand the rights of pregnant employees. House Bill 8, passed by a vote of 57-0, would require Illinois employers to provide employees with reasonable accommodations for conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth. The accommodations would include frequent water and bathroom breaks, help with manual labor, time-off to recover from childbirth, private non-bathroom space for breast-feeding or pumping, as well as modifications to job duties or work schedules. The legislation, which is a proposed amendment to the Illinois Human Rights Act, is expected to be passed by the Illinois House of Representative and signed into law by Governor Quinn.
On May 12, 2014, the Belleville News-Democrat reported that five employees of the former St. Clair County Clerk were paid a combined settlement of $665,000 by the County in connection with alleged claims of sexual harassment. The employees had reportedly filed alleged charges of sex discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights under Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The allegations of sexual harassment, which included inappropriate physical touching and sexual comments, were investigated by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is unlawful under Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act.
On May 6, 2014, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, held that the Illinois common law tort of retaliatory discharge applies only to at-will employees, and not to employees who have a definite contractual term of employment that is not renewed. Taylor v. Board of Education of Chicago, No. 123744, 2014 IL App (1st). Therefore, the plaintiff, who had a four-year employment contract, terminable only for cause, could not establish a common law claim for retaliatory discharge based upon the non-renewal of his employment contract. However, the Appellate Court also held that the non-renewal of an employment contract is actionable under the Illinois Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174). The plaintiff established a statutory claim under the Illinois Whistleblower Act on the basis that the non-renewal of his employment contract was in retaliation for his protected activity.
On May 2, 2014, the 7th Circuit held that an employer who grants an employee a leave of absence for some time under the Family and Medical Leave Act is estopped from subsequently claiming that the employee was not entitled to the FMLA leave. Holder v. Illinois Department of Corrections, No. 12-1456 (May 2, 2014). In its decision, the 7th Circuit stated that to establish a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act, an employee must show: (1) he was eligible for FMLA protection; (2) his employer is covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave to his employer; and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.
On May 5, 2014, the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Title VII national origin discrimination and retaliation claims. Hnin v. TOA, LLC, No. 13-3658 (May 5, 2014). In its decision, the 7th Circuit reiterated the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the indirect method of proof: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff was meeting his employer's legitimate job expectations; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) plaintiff's employer treated at least one similarly situated employee not in the plaintiff's protected class more favorably. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer's reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination.
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